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NOTE
STATE V. PHYSICIANS ET AL.:
LEGAL STANDARDS GUIDING THE
MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE AND THE
BIOETHICAL JUDGMENT OF
PEDIATRICIANS IN LIFE-SUSTAINING
MEDICAL TREATMENT
Mary Irene Sloninat
Neither Youth nor Childhood is Folly or Incapacity
Some Children are Fools & so are some Old Men.
-William Blake
INTRODUCTION
Every year approximately 53,000 children die in the United States
from trauma, lethal congenital conditions, extreme prematurity, heri-
table disorders, or acquired illnesses.1 American society's fear of dis-
cussing and facing the realities of death are compounded when the
dying patient is a child,2 a human being whose full potential will
never be realized. Unfortunately, child patients, parents, and physi-
cians face questions of treatment and the near-certain death of a child
everyday.3 Often all three parties will agree to the proper course of
I J.D. Candidate 2007, Case Western Reserve University School of Law;
B.A. 2003, The College of William & Mary. I would like to thank Professor Jessie
Hill for all of her guidance in writing this Note. I would also like to thank my family
and friends for their continued support of my academic endeavors.
1 Comm. on Bioethics & Comm. on Hosp. Care, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics,
Palliative Care for Children, 106 PEDIATRICS 351, 351 (2000) (footnote omitted).
2 See Melinda T. Derish & Kathleen Vanden Heuvel, Mature Minors Should
Have the Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
109, 110 (2000) (stating that "[p]atients with life-threatening diseases often do not
have frank discussions with their physician about what will happen if the treatment
options fail and death is likely... Physicians and parents rarely do discuss death with
chronically ill children.").
3 Some of these questions might include: What treatment will be most suc-
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treatment and will be a fairly unified entity until the end.4 But conflict
can and does arise in these emotionally-charged situations. The inter-
dependence of these three parties in making medical decisions that
will technically affect only one of the parties can result in pitting a
physically and emotionally suffering child against her emotionally
suffering parents; an ethically minded physician against parents who
want to save their child at any cost; or a child who wants to enjoy the
last days of her life free from medication, invasive tests, and stark
hospitals against a physician who is holding out hope that one final
treatment might give the patient more time to her life.
There is no question of an adult's right to make decisions con-
ceming life-sustaining medical treatments, regardless of whether the
decisions are in line with the opinions of doctors and society's norms.
5
Once a person has reached the age of eighteen, 6 she is legally inde-
cessful?; What are the side-effects of treatment?; Do the benefits of treatment out-
weigh the risks of treatment?; Is treatment in the best interests of the child?; At what
point is treatment futile?; When should the quality of life trump the quantity of life?
The list of questions is endless, but, in general, parents and physicians must confront
issues questioning the balance of benefit and risk to the child in treatment plans.
4 See Claire Amy Bartholome, The Rights of a Young Patient, 11 BIoETHICS
FORUM 35, 35 (1995) ("In my experience, most minors, no matter what respect they
have for their parents, doctors, and other care givers, ask for help in making important
decisions."). See also Kathleen G. Davis, Teaching the Three Rs: Rights, Roles and
Responsibilities - A Curriculum for Pediatric Patient Rights, 11 BIOETHICs FORUM
27, 29 (1995) (discussing how some adolescents may not want to make their own
medical decisions, rather passing the decision making to their parents).
5 See Sanford Leikin, A Proposal Concerning Decisions to Forgo Life-
Sustaining Treatment for Young People, 115 J. PEDIATRICS 17, 17-19 (1989). The
author distinguishes adolescent patients from the groupings of adult and infant pa-
tients:
Case law and living wills enunciate the right of the competent adult to make
decisions concerning life-sustaining treatment. Similar decisions for new-
born infants are assigned to parents or guardians. Guidelines on the termina-
tion of life-sustaining treatment and the care of dying patients have been
published for these two extreme age groups, but it is less clear how to pro-
ceed in situations involving dying adolescents.
Id. at 17 (citations omitted). See also Tara L. Kuther, Medical Decision-Making and
Minors: Issues of Consent and Assent, 38 ADOLESCENCE 343, 343 (2003) ("Although
adults receive considerable encouragement to become active participants in healthcare
decisions, children and adolescents often have little voice in decisions about their
medical treatment." (footnote omitted)).
6 Some states do not have a statute directly addressing the age of majority
but, rather, incorporate eighteen as the age of majority into section definitions. This
allows the legislature to change the age of majority, from the traditional eighteen
years of age, to other age thresholds when appropriate, such as for reproduction issues
and alcohol consumption. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.011 (3)(2) (West Supp.
1999); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2980 (McKinney 2002). Other states define the age
of majority in a stand alone statute. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6501 (West 2004).
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pendent to make her own medical decisions without interference. 7 On
the opposite side of the age spectrum, there is little debate as to par-
ents' rights to make medical decisions for their newborn or infant
child.' Somewhere in between young child and adult patient floats the
adolescent patient. Adolescence is the time span when a person tries
to develop a sense of independence and self-sufficiency, while utiliz-
ing the guidance, knowledge, and experience of older persons, usually
parents. 9 Inconsistencies abound in the levels of respect and responsi-
bility society provides to adolescents:
The laws devised to govern teenagers are layered, reflecting
society's alternating perceptions of teenagers as adult-like and
child-like, and our accompanying impulses to respect as well
as to protect this population... [W]e trust eighteen year olds
enough to let them fight and die in the military, but not
enough to let them drink alcoholic beverages.1 °
A life-stage fraught with conflict, the addition of a life-threatening
illness brings the independence issues of an adolescent to the fore-
ground, as the patient, parents, and physicians ask who has the final
decision in how this minor's illness should or should not be treated?
State statutes and common law have created exceptions to paren-
tal consent for minors in particular areas of medical conditions includ-
ing sexually transmitted diseases, drug abuse, and mental health.1"
7 The Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990 requires all health care agen-
cies to recognize an individual's living will and durable power of attorney. The Act
also requires health care agencies to ask whether an individual has an advanced direc-
tive and must advise the individual about her medical rights under state law. See Pub.
L. No. 101-508, § 4206, 104 Stat. 1388-115 (1990); Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4751, 104
Stat. 1388-204 (1990).
8 Leikin, supra note 5, at 17. But see Comm. on Bioethics, Am. Acad. of
Pediatrics, Ethics and the Care of Critically IIl Infants and Children, 98 PEDIATRICS
149, 149-51 (1996) (discussing concerns that parents and physicians might not always
act in the best interest of the infant patient, thus raising a debate whether the parents
and physicians should be the only decision-makers of an infant's medical care);
Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When Parents Should
Make Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. L.
REv. 1, 43 (2000) ("Although generally families are the favored decision-makers,
exceptions may exist where the family member is unlikely to make decisions in the
patient's best interests.").
9 See discussion infra pp. 190-93.
10 Michelle Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHics
127, 127 (1996).
1 See Lawrence Schlam & Joseph P. Wood, Informed Consent to the Medi-
cal Treatment of Minors: Law and Practice, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 141, 163-66 (2000);
Oberman, supra note 10, at 130-31 ("Today, every state has a statute that permits
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Criminal courts often take little or no issue with declaring a minor
competent to be tried as an adult. As one commentator has noted,
"Many criminal courts certainly are convinced that juveniles can be
tried as adults. Can we thus say that the 16-year-old has the right to be
treated as an adult and make his or her own medical decisions?"' 2 The
analogy may not be perfect, but it is one that further indicates the in-
consistencies the legal community has created in handling adoles-
cents' rights.
The development of the mature minor doctrine at common law
was intended to create an exception to the general rule that parental
consent was always needed to medically treat minors.13 Minors that
demonstrate "maturity" could provide consent without their parents.
But the unintended result of the application of the mature minor doc-
trine can be found in the majority of mature minor cases: there are so
many factors a judge (or jury) must take into consideration when de-
termining if a minor is mature that a well-reasoned, unambiguous, and
uniform standard has failed to emerge. A trial judge's discretion, not
guidelines, determines maturity.14 Accordingly, the concept of matu-
unemancipated minors, ranging in age from fourteen to seventeen, to consent to care
for sexually transmitted diseases."); Linda Sorenson Ewald, Medical Decision
Making for Children: An Analysis of Competing Interests, 25 ST. Louis U. L.J. 689,
700-04 (1982). For statutory examples, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3709.241,
3719.012, 5122.04 (West 2002).
12 Andrew Newman, Adolescent Consent to Routine Medical and Surgical
Treatment, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 501, 501-02 (2001) (arguing there should be a bright-
line statutory rule that any minor over the age of 16 should be allowed to make her
own medical decisions). The practice of trying minors as adults has been on the rise.
"Between 1988-1998, the number of juveniles prosecuted as adults for major violent
felonies rose 47%." Id. at 522. In raising questions as to the arguments that can made
from trying minors as adults and then not allowing minors to make their own medical
decisions, the author qualifies his analogy by stating "there is probably only a tenuous
relationship between the concepts and values brought to bear on the area of teen-
criminal defendants and on teens who are looking to make their own medical deci-
sions." Id. at 525.
13 The mature minor exception joined three previously common law excep-
tions to treat a minor without parental consent: (1) medical emergencies, (2) legal
emancipation, and (3) minor treatment statutes. See discussion infra pp. 188-93.
14 Two commentators have summarized the issue:
Trial judges exercise discretion in determining when a minor is mature, and
do not have to articulate how they ascertained that fact .... [N]othing in
law school and little in an average judge's experience provide a meaningful
framework for making such a decision [regarding whether the minor is ma-
ture]." Therefore, because each judge will tend to have her own opinion as
to whether a child is mature, critics argue, applications of the doctrine have
been inconsistent ....
Schlam & Wood, supra note 11, at 162 (footnotes omitted).
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rity is not easily defined, 15 but there has been no movement within the
judiciary or legislatures to clarify or simplify the doctrine's standards
so minors, parents, and physicians know what to expect when legal
action is necessary.
This Note will argue that a sufficient new standard for the mature
minor doctrine should be based on the determination of the treating
physician and medical team as to the minor patient's capacity and,
thus, maturity to make her own medical decisions when faced with a
life-threatening affliction. 16 The medical community's policies on a
minor's consent and bioethical guidelines place the physician in the
best position, as compared to a judge or the parents, to gauge the mi-
nor's maturity. These factors are in addition to a physician's medical
training and experience that comes with his profession. A physician
has more tools to determine the maturity of a minor than any other
party who would be involved in life-sustaining medical treatment de-
cisions.
Part I of this Note will outline the development of the mature mi-
nor doctrine. Part II will discuss three court decisions that establish
standards to determine application of the mature minor doctrine and
the ultimate failure of these standards to create a defined, uniform
application of the doctrine. Part III discusses how the medical com-
munity judges and determines the capacity of an adolescent to make
medical decisions. This section also discusses the medical commu-
nity's debate as to how much deference an adolescent patient's opin-
ion should be given in deciding whether the minor should undergo
life-sustaining treatments when facing a deadly disease. Finally, Part
IV will argue that incorporating or giving substantial deference to the
medical community's standards and opinions for maturity evaluation
would provide the law with a standard that is more rational and better-
suited than the current haphazard standards enunciated in the common
law.'
7
15 Jessica A. Penkower, Comment, The Potential Right of Chronically Ill
Adolescents to Refuse Life-Saving Medical Treatment - Fatal Misuse of the Mature
Minor Doctrine, 45 DEPAULL. REv. 1165, 1167(1996).
16 For a discussion on terminal illnesses, see David R. Freyer, Care of the
Dying Adolescent: Special Considerations, 113 PEDIATRIcs 381, 386 (2004).
17 This Note will not discuss the rights of minors to make decisions regarding
reproductive rights, sexually transmitted diseases, or other medical areas that statutory
law has already created definite age exceptions because those medical exceptions are
settled.
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I. MEDICAL PROCEDURES AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS
OF MINORS TO CONSENT
A. Brief History of Children's Rights
Historically, common law defined children as the chattel, or prop-
erty, of their parents.1 8 Children were thought to be incompetent and
devoid of the capacity to make their own legitimate decisions.' 9
Anglo-American societies have long held a person to be a child until
her twenty-first birthday.2° It was not until the onset of puberty that
various societies would recognize the beginning of a status change of
a person from child to adult, slowly becoming responsible for her own
being.21 Legal recognition of adulthood evolved around the concept of
adolescence marking the beginning of adulthood. The Rule of Sevens,
an ancient Anglo-Saxon law that can still be found woven into Ameri-
can law, did not hold children responsible for criminal acts before the
age of seven.2 2 After the age of fourteen, children were completely
responsible for their actions.23 Between the ages of seven and four-
teen, "courts adopted a rebuttable presumption that [children] possess
an adult capacity to do evil."24
This historical perspective on children's rights transferred to de-
veloping American law. In the case of Morrissey v. Perry,25 the
Supreme Court commented on a provision of the federal code that
allowed persons under the age of twenty-one to enlist in the military
only after obtaining the written consent of a parent or guardian. The
petitioner had been only seventeen when he enlisted in the military
18 Newman, supra note 12, at 502.
19 Ann Eileen Driggs, The Mature Minor Doctrine: Do Adolescents Have
The Right to Die?, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 687,689 (2001).
20 Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's
Capacity to Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1873, 1877 (1996).
21 Id. at 1876.
22 Id.
23 Id. Align this fact with the traditional Anglo-American rule that a person
obtains legal adulthood at age twenty-one, and one may note that most adult responsi-
bilities are passed on to a person from the age of fourteen through her twenty-first
birthday (e.g. working outside the home, driving, voting, marrying, and consuming
alcohol).
24 Id. The early teenage years are often the beginning of puberty for children.
As the Rule of Sevens marked age fourteen as the onset of complete adult responsibil-
ity, this age was also viewed as the line between childhood and adulthood by other
societies. The Romans presumed that people understood the law at age fourteen. The
Christian and Jewish faiths have often "accorded a child responsibilities to the com-
munity around age thirteen." Id.
25 137 U.S. 157 (1890).
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without his mother's consent. He argued that his mother's non-
consent meant his enlistment was illegal, and, thus, he should be dis-
charged. But the Court ruled that the provision requiring parental
consent was for the benefit of the parents, not the minor; if the parent
had not attempted to bring the consent provision before a court after
petitioner's enlistment, the provision was waived and the minor had to
serve out his time in the military. 26 In its opinion, the Court com-
mented on government interference with parental rights: "[The provi-
sion] means simply that the government will not disturb the control of
[a] parent or guardian over his or her child without consent., 27
The onset of the Industrial Revolution saw the emergence of chil-
dren's advocacy groups and the promotion of child labor law, result-
ing in the state taking away some parental right to control the actions
of children.28 But major recognition of children's rights in the United
States did not occur until the 1960s and 1970s. In In re Gault,29 the
Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment extended to children. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independ-
ent Community School District,30 the Court recognized the fundamen-
tal rights of minors (high school students in that particular case) and
stated that "[s]tudents in school as well as out of school are 'persons'
under our Constitution.",31 Reproductive and privacy rights that had
been constitutionally guaranteed to adults32 were extended to minors,
although often in some limited form.33 In 1971, ratification of the
26 Id. at 158-60.
27 Id.
28 See Newman, supra note 12, at 503. See also Schlam & Wood, supra note
11, at 147 (stating that, along with child labor laws, societal changes from the Indus-
trial Revolution prompted legislatures to pass compulsory education laws).
29 387 U.S. 1 (1967).3' 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that a school district's prohibition on black
arm bands, which students wore in protest of the Vietnam War, without proof that the
arm bands would lead to a substantial disruption or material interference with school
activities, was a violation of the students' constitutional right to freedom of expres-
sion). But see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (holding that a New York
State law that prohibited the sale of sexually oriented magazines to minors was not in
violation of the First Amendment because the state has a heightened authority to
protect minors as opposed to adults).
31 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
32 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (declaring
unconstitutional a state law that prohibited contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (declaring unconstitutional a state law that prohibited the distribution
of contraceptives to non-married individuals); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(holding that the Constitution protects a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy
before the fetus has reached viability).
33 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (holding that if a minor sought
and was granted judicial approval for an abortion, the state could not further require
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Twenty-Sixth Amendment lowered the voting age from twenty-one to
eighteen.34 But, even with these decisions, there remained the general
rule that the law granted parents broad decision-making power over
their children, as observed by the Supreme Court in Parham v. J. R. 35
in 1979:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience,
and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult
decisions. More important, historically it has been recognized
that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best
interests of their children.36
B. Statutory Exceptions to Parental Consent in Medical Procedures
The recognition of children's rights by the mid-twentieth century
did not encompass a minor's decisional rights in relation to general
medical procedures. As with many legal concepts, several exceptions
developed from the general rule. The four recognized exceptions to
parental consent are: (1) emergencies, (2) emancipation, (3) minor
treatment statutes, and (4) the mature minor doctrine.37 The earliest
exceptions to common law addressed the need of a minor to receive
treatment in an emergency and those minors who had been legally
emancipated from their parents or guardians.38 The emergency excep-
tion reflects a societal notion that it is cruel to allow a minor to sit in
her to notify her parents of the abortion).
34 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
31 442 U.S. 584, 606, 620-21 (1979) (ruling a Georgia law constitutional that
required a "'neutral factfinder' to evaluate a child against statutory requirements
before her parents could request the child's admission in to a mental health institu-
tion).
36 Id. at 602.
37 Discrepancies exist among commentators as to whether the mature minor
doctrine is an exception to parental consent or a separate legal concept. Compare
Allison Mantz, Do Not Resuscitate Decision-Making: Ohio 's Do Not Resuscitate Law
Should Be Amended To Include A Mature Minor's Right To Initiate a DNR Order, 17
J.L. & HEALTH 359, 370 (2003) (defining the mature minor doctrine as an "exception"
to the general rule), and Driggs, supra note 19, at 690 ("The courts have recognized
[the mature minor doctrine as one of] three exceptions to the requirement for parental
consent in medical treatment of children .... "), with Penkower, supra note 15, at
1179 (stating that the mature minor doctrine is part of "a gray area into which the
common law has attempted to extend the rights of minors regarding their health
care."). There appears to be no commentary on this discrepancy or arguments made
for one classification over the other. This Note will assume that the mature minor
doctrine is an exception to the general rule.
38 Penkower, supra note 15, at 1176.
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pain because a medical professional, wishing to avoid a lawsuit, re-
fuses to treat the minor without parental consent. 39 One commentator
has defined "[a]n 'emergency' . . . as anything requiring relatively
urgent attention or that is causing a child pain or fear.' 4° The second
exception, emancipation, recognizes the legal rights a minor earns
once a court has granted her emancipated minor status. If an emanci-
pated minor has the same legal rights as an adult, she is allowed to
make her own medical decisions like an adult.
4
'
The majority of modem exceptions to parental consent for a mi-
nor's treatment are found in state statutes.42 In the 1960s, an epidemic
of sexually transmitted diseases amongst teenagers led states to pass
"'minor treatment statutes. ' , '43 These statutes allowed minors, without
parental consent, to receive contraceptives and treatments for sexually
transmitted diseases."a The concern for public health extended to the
creation of minor treatment statutes for alcohol abuse, substance
abuse, and psychiatric care. 45 To generalize, conditions covered by
minor treatment statutes "all had a great social stigma associated with
them and minors may be reluctant to seek treatment if they must first
advise their parents .... More importantly, these conditions all have
implications that extend beyond the individual minor involved.
' 46
39 ANGELA RODDEY HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT
MEDICINE 126 (2d ed. 1985).
40 Id. at 125-26.
41 See Penkower, supra note 15, at 1177 (noting that states have different
judicial standards in granting emancipation, but generally an emancipated minor may
consent to her own medical care); Driggs, supra note 19, at 691. See also Oberman,
supra note 10, at 130 ("The definition of emancipation varies from state to state, but
it is generally limited to minors who are not living at home, who are not economically
dependent on their parents, and whose parents have surrendered parental duties. In the
past, this category consisted primarily of married minors and minors in the military
service." (footnote omitted)).
42 See Ewald, supra note 11, at 701; Oberman, supra note 10, at 130;
Penkower, supra note 15, at 1177.
43 Oberman, supra note 10, at 130 (footnote omitted).
44 Id. at 130-31. Minor treatment statutes should not be thought of as legisla-
tive recognition that some minors were mature: "Society's interest in halting the
spread of sexually transmitted diseases was the true motivating force in promulgating
these laws, not society's belief that some minors could be sufficiently mature to make
medical decisions for themselves." Penkower, supra note 15, at 1178.
45 See statutes cited supra note 11.
46 Ewald, supra note 11, at 701.
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II. JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF THE MATURE MINOR
DOCTRINE
The mature minor doctrine is the fourth, and most recent, excep-
tion to the general rule that minors are incompetent and subject to the
decisional control of their parents or guardians. 47 Its increased devel-
opment in judicial opinions in the last twenty years or so has allowed
"a minor who exhibits the 'maturity' of an adult to make decisions
that traditionally have been reserved for persons who have attained the
age of majority. '48 The application of this maxim has seen many dif-
ferent interpretations when applied to life-threatening illnesses, as
opposed to illnesses that are not serious.49 The result is the lack of a
clear standard and reasonable expectations in the way a mature minor
case will be decided by the courts.
Case law is the primary place to study the standards of applying
the mature minor doctrine. In Cardwell v. Bechtol,50 the Supreme
Court of Tennessee expressly adopted the mature minor doctrine. The
court reinstated the trial court judgment that an osteopath had not
committed battery in treating a minor, age seventeen and seven
months, for back pain without the consent of her parents. 51 Although
the facts did not involve a life-threatening illness, the court supplied a
comprehensive list of characteristics to take into consideration when
determining whether a minor had the capacity to agree to any medical
treatment: age, ability, experience, maturity, education, training, and
demeanor.52 The court indicated that these factors were to be taken in
the context of the whole medical situation, including the ability of the
minor to understand the treatment, the risks, and the consequences.
53
47 Mantz, supra note 37, at 370.
48 Penkower, supra note 15, at 1166.
49 Two commentators have noted that "[c]ontroversy regarding the 'mature
minor' doctrine does not center upon the justification for the rule itself, but upon its
application." Schlam & Wood, supra note 11, at 162. The authors continue to explain:
[t]he 'mature minor' doctrine has been consistently applied ... in cases in
which the minor (1) is near the age of majority, usually fifteen years or
older, (2) displays the capacity to understand the nature and risks of the
treatment, and (3) where the nature of the treatment is not 'serious.'
Id. at 163.
0 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987).
51 Id. at 742-43.
52 Id. at 748.
53 Id. at 749. The court, similar to courts before it, followed the adoption of
the mature minor doctrine with the statement, "[w]e do not, however, alter the general
rule requiring parental consent for the medical treatment of minors." Id. at 749.
[Vol. 17:181
STATE V. PHYSICIANS ET AL.
The Rule of Sevens' age presumptions were the final determining
factor.54
In the case of In re E.G.,55 the petitioner, E.G., was a seventeen-
year-old suffering from leukemia. As a Jehovah's Witness, E.G.
refused recommended blood transfusion treatments; without the treat-
ments, E.G. would certainly have died within a month.56 Her mother,
also a Jehovah's Witness, supported the decision. Because of the
treatment refusal, the State filed a petition in juvenile court seeking to
take custody of E.G. and perform the blood transfusions.57 During the
hearings, E.G. testified that she was refusing the treatments because of
her own religious convictions and not because she had a determination
to die.58 Several witness, including a psychiatrist, testified as to the
maturity of E.G. and the sincerity of her religious beliefs. 59 The trial
court noted the maturity of E.G. but ruled that the State's interest out-
weighed her right to refuse treatment. On appeal, the appellate court
reversed and ruled that, as a "mature minor," E.G. had a constitutional
right to refuse medical treatment.60 The State appealed to the Illinois
Supreme Court, which upheld the determination that a mature minor
had a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment. As with the
common law right of an adult to refuse life-sustaining medical treat-
ment,61 the court noted that a mature minor's right to refuse treatment
had to be weighed "against four State interests: (1) the preservation of
life; (2) protecting the interests of third parties; (3) [the] prevention of
suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical pro-
fession., 62 In cases involving minors, protecting the interest of third
parties or, more precisely, the interests of the parents was the criteria
courts were to give the highest regard.63 Since E.G. and her mother
agreed to refuse treatment, this interest was moot. E.G. was allowed to
make her own medical decisions concerning the leukemia.
A third influential case in the development of judicial standards
for the mature minor doctrine was In re Long Island Jewish Medical
54 Id. at 748. See discussion supra p. 186.
15 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989).
56 Jehovah's Witnesses believe that blood transfusions constitute "'eating"'
blood, an act prohibited by their religion. Id. at 323.
7 Id. at 323-24.
58 Id. at 324.
59 Id.
60 id.
61 See In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 292, 302 (Ill. 1989).
62 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 328.
63 See, e.g., id. (showing deference to the importance of the decision to the
family unit and dynamics).
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Center.64 In that case, the minor, a month shy of his eighteenth birth-
day and suffering from a cancer, refused a blood transfusion because
he was a Jehovah's Witness; his parents agreed with the refusal. Upon
petition by the treating hospital, the court ordered the minor to un-
dergo transfusions after several doctors said they would not treat the
minor with chemotherapy unless they also had the power to give him
blood transfusions.65 Without the chemotherapy, the minor was ex-
pected to live up to a month. On appeal, the court said that common
law preserved a competent adult's right to refuse medical treatment,
but when a patient was a minor, the court had a parens patriae power
"because parents may throw their own lives away, if they wish, but
they cannot make martyrs of their children., 66 The New York court
cited the decisions of Cardwell and In re E.G. as evidence of a recent
trend in the courts to adopt the mature minor doctrine.67 But without
any rationale, the court ruled the minor's refusal to undergo treatment
was not based on a "mature understanding" of his religion or the fatal
consequences of his decision; the minor was not a "'mature minor"'
and was ordered to undergo the blood transfusions.68
These three cases clearly demonstrate a range in the standards
courts are applying to mature minor cases. The Cardwell standard is
complex; it takes into consideration seven factors of the minor's pres-
ence, three factors of the minor's understanding of his illness, and
then the final factor of the Rule of Sevens. The balance of all those
factors, colored by the personal views and experiences of judges,
could produce a wide range of decisions with an infinite variety of
rationales. This standard is focused on the child, questioning the ca-
pabilities of the child and the interests of the child. The In re E.G.
64 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
61 Id. at 240-42.
66 Id. at 243.
67 Id. The court quoted In re E.G.:
If the evidence is clear and convincing that the minor is mature enough to
appreciate the consequences of her actions, and that the minor is mature
enough to exercise the judgment of an adult, then the mature minor doctrine
affords her the common law right to consent to or refuse medical treatment.
Id. The court also quoted Cardwell v. Bechtol: "Recognition that minors achieve
varying degrees of maturity and responsibility (capacity) has been part of the common
law for well over a century." Id. Despite reiterating the language of two jurisdictions
that adopted the mature minor doctrine and using the respective articulated standards
to determine the minors in each case were legally allowed to make their own medical
decisions, the New York court did not mention the outcomes of In re E.G. or
Cardwell in its opinion.
68 Long Island, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 243. The court concluded in footnote 15 that
the minor would soon be eighteen and "his life will then be in his own hands." Id. at
243 n.15.
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standard focuses on the state's interest in the minor, with the most
important interest being the opinion of the minor's parents on the
situation. In comparison with the Cardwell standard, the In re E.G.
standard is parent-focused. With a brief mention of how children ma-
ture at different paces, 69 the In re E.G. court makes no mention of how
to determine the maturity of a minor. The ability of the Cardwell and
In re E.G. courts to at least make some effort to articulate a standard
on which judges can base a decision rationale is highlighted by the
Long Island court's complete absence of rationale in reaching its deci-
sion. It articulates no standard to apply the mature minor doctrine after
curiously discussing the standards of Cardwell and In re E.G. What
makes this decision even more perplexing and what is possibly an
attempt to side-step the issue,7° is that the court rules against a minor
weeks away from his eighteenth birthday. The Long Island court rules
opposite to the two preceding decisions. The facts of this case were
highly similar to the facts of Cardwell, and yet the former gives no
deference to the Cardwell court and gives no reason for its lack of
deference. 71 These three court decisions leave the debate with three
distinct opinions on the mature minor doctrine: Cardwell creates a
standard so amorphous that it is almost a standard calling for a case-
by-case determination; In re E.G. creates a standard that is deferential
to parental opinion with no focus on the child's maturity; and Long
Island creates no standard, leaving the impression that a court may
determine a mature minor case how it sees fit without explanation.
69 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 327. See discussion supra note 67 (quoting
Cardwell).
70 The court recommends "that the legislature or the appellate courts take a
hard look at the 'mature minor' doctrine and make it either statutory or decisional law
in New York State." Long Island, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 243. One could argue that the
court is refusing to legislate from the bench and by articulating a mature minor stan-
dard it would be doing just that. Again, the court's reference to the Cardwell and In re
E.G. decisions is perplexing because it is referring to two courts that did not take
overt issue with judicially creating standards for the mature minor doctrine.
71 Again, an odd occurrence considering that the Long Island court discusses
both the decisions of Cardwell and In re E.G..
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III. MEDICAL STANDARDS TO DETERMINE AN
ADOLESCENT'S MATURITY AND OPINIONS ON
ADOLESCENT'S CAPACITY FOR HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS
A. Defining "Adolescence"
As each person is unique in her physical and emotional state, so is
the uniqueness of the development of each person into an adult. Many
researchers have nonetheless attempted to develop a theory generaliz-
ing the development of children. Jean Piaget is argued to be the most
influential child development researcher.72 He spent years observing
children with the end result being the creation of the Piagetian Cogni-
tive Development Theory. The theory posits that there are four basic
levels of cognitive development.73 Level Four, the last cognitive de-
velopment stage, takes place between ages eleven and fifteen. It is at
this stage that a child can imagine the past, present, and future condi-
tions of a situation and hypothesize how the situation might occur in
different conditions. At this level, children can solve problems by
applying theories and engaging in pure thought aside from real-world
actions. 74 "In Piagetian theory, by the age of fifteen, a child's thinking
has evolved into a mature state[,] and adult thought exists within the
child's repertoire of mental functions. 75
72 See Mlyniec, supra note 20, at 1878; Schlam & Wood, supra note 11, at
153.
73 Mlyniec, supra note 20, at 1878.
Level One ... occurs from birth to two years old .... At the end of this
stage, children can mentally plan simple physical tasks using objects in
view.... Level Two ... occurs between two and seven years of age....
[A]t this level children gain a facility for language and move from simple
problem solving... to incipient logical thought. Nonetheless, direct percep-
tion, rather than logical thought and governing principles, primarily influ-
ence this intuitive thinking. Thus, according to Piaget, children under the
age of seven cannot engage in truly intellectual activities .... Level Three
... occurs between seven and eleven years of age. During this period, chil-
dren begin to understand causation, gain a more objective view of the uni-
verse .... attain a better understanding of others' perceptions .... [, and]
begin to understand why physical events occur.
Id. 1879.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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Although there have been critiques of Piaget's theory,76 modem
researchers tend not to stray from the basic premises of Piaget's re-
search. In 1989, Dr. Sanford Leikin attempted to align the Piagetian
stages with the stages in which a child comprehends medical treat-
ments and has the ability to consent to them.77 According to Leikin,
there are four concepts a child must grasp before she has the ability to
consent 78 to medical treatment: understanding, reasoning, voluntari-
ness, and comprehension of death. "Understanding" an illness requires
a child to comprehend a disease as a process attacking her body.
Leikin believes that children under the age of 11, or before Level Four
of Piagetian Development, do not understand the process of a disease
and rather just see illnesses as something outside their body attacking
it.79 "Reasoning" means a child must be able to think about the long
term effects of her disease and treatment.8 ° She should be capable of
abstract thinking in order to synthesize and analyze past, present, and
future events.8' All of this is associated with the beginning of Level
Four around age twelve. 82 The third concept, "voluntariness," tends
not to appear in adolescents under the age of fourteen or fifteen.83 At
this age range children's decisions appear not to be a mere acquies-
cence of authority figures' wishes. Rather, children at the end of Level
Four have developed and used logical process thinking to understand
their illness and possible treatments. 84 This allows children to reach a
conclusion in the same capacity any adult would; hence, the lack of
dependency on other adults' opinions.85 "Comprehension and moral
76 Some fault Piaget for only studying the "average" child and not taking into
account a child's unique environmental experiences, interactions with particular per-
sons, and a child's particular genetic structure. Id. at 1880. See also William Gardner
et al., Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive Development and Adolescent Legal
Rights, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 895, 898 (1989) (arguing that adolescent development
does not occur in stages, but rather occurs at different times across task domains).
77 Leikin, supra note 5, at 20-21 ("Medical decision making by young people
requires the same abilities as those used by adults: understanding the medical infor-
mation, considering or reasoning about it, and freely choosing from among the op-
tions."). See also Nancy M. P. King & Alan W. Cross, Children as Decision Makers:
Guidelines for Pediatricians, 115 J. PEDIATRICS 10, 12-14 (1989) (discussing four
factors physicians should use in determining a child's capacity for informed consent:
reasoning, understanding, voluntariness, and the nature of the decision).
8 See infra notes 104-05.
79 Leikin, supra note 5, at 20.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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views of death" is the last factor in Leikin's analysis. He states it is
unrealistic to expect a very young child to comprehend death because
it manifests a great childhood fear: separation from those who protect
and comfort. 86 Young children see death as something that happens to
others and not to them.87 Again, as with voluntariness, it appears that
the concept of death is not fully understood until the age of fourteen
or fifteen, when the adolescent has the capability to "[grasp] ... the
possibilities and limitations of one's self in relation to a finite
future .... 88
The limited amount of empirical research on cognitive develop-
ment and medical decisions supports Piagetian theory that around age
fifteen children have the same decision-making capabilities as an
adult.89 In a well-known 1982 study, two researchers wanted to test
the proposition of the late Supreme Court Justice, William 0. Douglas
that "the moral and intellectual maturity of the 14-year-old approaches
that of the adult." 90 They hypothesized an empirical comparison of the
competency of fourteen-year-olds and adults would support Justice
Douglas' statement. They took a test group of 96 subjects, and divided
them into four groups of twenty-four subjects by age: (1) eight and a
half to nine and a half, (2) fourteen, (3) eighteen, and (4) twenty-
one.91 The subjects were presented with four hypothetical medical
dilemmas and were asked to choose treatment options for each of the
illnesses in the situations.92 The subjects' responses to questions were
evaluated and scored by a panel of twenty experts on four standards of
competency: evidence of choice, reasonable outcome, rational rea-
sons, and understanding. The results indicated that fourteen-year-olds
demonstrated a competency equal to that of eighteen and twenty-one-
year-olds. The nine-year-olds demonstrated less competency than the
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. The author cites several examples of adolescents coming to terms with
their impending death, such as one sixteen year old with cancer. In declining chemo-
therapy, the adolescent patient said, "'Now it's not the quantity of years it's the qual-
ity of years."' Id. at 21.
89 See Kuther, supra note 5, at 349-50 ("Research comparing the decision-
making capacity of adolescents and adults is rare.. many theorists argue that there is
little evidence that minors aged 15 and older are less able to provide consent than are
adults." (citation omitted)); Lois A. Weithom & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency
of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV.
1589, 1589 (1982).
90 Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 89, at 1589 (quoting Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 n.3 (1972)).
9' Id. at 1591.
92 The four dilemmas were diabetes, epilepsy, depression, and enuresis. Id. at
1592.
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fourteen-year-olds, but the former group still appeared to be fairly
competent in making treatment decisions.93 Another study asked
sixty-two adolescents, age ten to twenty, to list the potential benefits
and risks of certain medical treatments.94 Non-significant trends in
responses revealed that the older adolescents (age fourteen and up)
were able to list a greater number of benefits and risks of the medical
treatments and were able to anticipate the consequences of treatment
in more abstract manner.95 As one psychologist has noted on devel-
opmental research outside the medical treatment context:
Comparisons of adolescent and adult decision-making with
regard to risky behaviors (e.g., substance use, alcohol use, un-
protected sexual activity) have demonstrated that adolescents
and adults are equally able to identify possible consequences
of risky behavior. In addition, adolescents and adults assess
the consequences similarly; they estimate similar probabilities
or likelihoods of consequences.96
B. Medical Institutions' Policies Concerning a Minor's Capacity to
Consent
In promulgating country-wide medical policy, the American
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) 97 researches and develops policy for
pediatricians to follow in practice. As the primary American medical
organization dedicated to children's health, the AAP has published
several statements outlining guidelines concerning who should make
medical decisions for minors and when minors possess the capacity to
make their own medical decisions.
In 1994, the AAP's Committee on Bioethics published Guidelines
on Forgoing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment (Guidelines).98 In an
overt showing of respect for a minor's wishes, the committee wrote:
"Generally, parents give permission for the treatment of children who
93 Id. at 1595-96. The authors note, "Our findings support predictions based
upon Piagetian concepts of cognitive development." Id. at 1595.
9 Kuther, supra note 5, at 349.
95 Id.
96 Id. (citations omitted).
97 The AAP was founded in 1930 to promote children's health. As of 2004,
the AAP had a membership of 60,000 primary care pediatricians, pediatric medical
subspecialists, and pediatric surgical specialists. The AAP publishes the monthly
scientific journal Pediatrics. See AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, AAP-AT-A-GLANCE
(2004), available at http://www.aap.org/75/profile/aapprofile-complete.pdf.
98 Comm. on Bioethics, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Guidelines on Forgoing
Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 93 PEDIATRICS 532 (1994).
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cannot do so themselves. However, the American Academy of Pediat-
rics emphasizes that physicians and parents should give great weight
to clearly expressed views of child patients regarding [life-sustaining
medical treatment], regardless of the legal particulars."99
The committee follows this passage with a definition of compe-
tency and guidelines physicians are to use to determine a person's
decision-making capacity:
Decision-making capacity and the legal term "competency"
refer to the ability of a person to make decisions at particular
times under particular circumstances. One formulation of this
overall capacity involves three essential elements: (1) the abil-
ity to understand and communicate information relevant to a
decision; (2) the ability to reason and deliberate concerning
the decision; and (3) the ability to apply a set of values to a
decision that may involve conflicting elements. Each potential
decision maker regarding [life-sustaining medical treatment]
should manifest these abilities. However, children should
have the opportunity to participate in decisions about [life-
sustaining medical treatment] to whatever extent their abili-
ties allow.'0
0
Again, the AAP reasserts a physician's duty to respect the wishes
of the minor in regards to treatment. This excerpt suggests that if a
minor possesses the same decisional capabilities of an adult, why
should the child not be allowed to make a decision like an adult?1 °1
The policy also instructs a physician to make a formal assessment of a
patient's capacity to make decisions and to document the assess-
ment. 1
0 2
Following the aforementioned policy statement, the AAP's Com-
mittee on Bioethics published Informed Consent, Parental Permis-
sion, and Assent in Pediatric Practice (Informed Consent).10 3 This
policy statement refers to more general medical procedures; it does
99 Id. at 532 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
100 Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
101 This argument is supported by another sentence in the policy statement:
"[T]he gravity of decisions about [life-sustaining medical treatment] requires careful,
explicit attention to the wishes and feelings of the children, regardless of the legal
status of the patients." Id. at 535. But all of these passages could also suggest simply
that the physicians must listen to the minor patient, but not necessarily completely
defer to her wishes.
102 Id.
103 Comm. on Bioethics, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Informed Consent, Paren-
tal Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314 (1995).
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not focus on life-sustaining medical treatment. The statement distin-
guishes informed consent1°4 from assent,10 5 two separate concepts and
each equally important to a minor receiving medical care. Informed
consent occurs when the patient has been given all the information on
her illness and all possible options in treating her illness before decid-
ing on a course of action. °6 Assent occurs when the patient agrees to
a course of action decided on by a third party; the third party has
decided the course of action after receiving all the information on the
patient's illness and all possible treatment options. 107 "Only patients
who have appropriate decisional capacity and legal empowerment can
give their informed consent to medical care. In all other situations,
104 A universal medical concept, "informed consent," calls upon a physician
to disclose all information to a patient about her illness and treatments:
Experts on informed consent include at least the following elements in their
discussions of the concept:
1. Provision of information: patients should have explanations, in un-
derstandable language, of the nature of the ailment or condition; the
nature of the proposed diagnostic steps and/or treatment(s) and the
probability of their success; the existence and nature of the risks in-
volved; and the existence, potential benefits, and risks of recom-
mended alternative treatments (including the choice of no treatment).
2. Assessment of the patient's understanding of the above information.
3. Assessment, if only tacit, of the capacity of the patient or surrogate
to make the necessary decision(s).
4. Assurance, insofar as is possible, that the patient has the freedom to
choose among the medical alternatives without coercion or manipula-
tion.
Id. at 314-15.
105 Assent is the agreement of a patient to a course of action regarding her
illness:
Assent should include at least the following elements:
1. Helping the patient achieve a developmentally appropriate aware-
ness of the nature of his or her condition.
2. Telling the patient what he or she can expect with tests and treat-
ment(s).
3. Making a clinical assessment of the patient's understanding of the
situation and the factors influencing how he or she is responding (in-
cluding whether there is inappropriate pressure to accept testing or
therapy).
4. Soliciting an expression of the patient's willingness to accept the
proposed care. Regarding this final point, we note that no one should
solicit a patient's views without intending to weigh them seriously. In
situations in which the patient will have to receive medical care despite
his or her objection, the patient should be told that fact and should not
be deceived.
Id. at 315-16 (emphasis omitted).
106 See id. at 314-16.
107 See id. at 315-16.
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parents or other surrogates provide informed permission for diagnosis
and treatment of children with the assent of the child whenever appro-
priate."'10 8 The second sentence of the quote states that when a child is
too young to comprehend her illness and treatment, the parents should
make the informed decisions, but the child should express her accep-
tance (or assent) of the proposed treatment. The former sentence,
however, suggests there may be instances when the minor patient may
provide informed consent without her parents. The AAP "encourages"
physicians to seek consent according to three groupings: (1) informed
permission of the parents when the minor is an infant or young child;
(2) assent of the patient and informed permission of the parents when
the minor is of older school age; and (3) the informed consent of ado-
lescents and young adults. 109 The policy goes a step further to suggest
that empirical data, although limited, indicates that adolescents over
the age of fourteen "may have as well developed decisional skills as
adults for making informed health care decisions."" 
0
Both Guidelines and Informed Consent instruct physicians to
avoid judicial intervention when there are conflicts concerning con-
sent. Guidelines states that there is a "presumption against judicial
review" and warns that legal adjudication should only be sought when
it is required by law or when the parties have been unable to settle a
disagreement through other measures. ' Informed Consent does not
take such an ominous tone about legal recourse, but mentions that an
adolescent's refusal to consent to medical treatment might be legally
and ethically binding upon the physician."
2
One must concede that neither of the AAP's policy statements
explicitly state that physicians, upon determining a minor to be com-
petent to make her own medical decisions, should listen to only the
patient's wishes and not the parents'. But the guidelines also do not
rule out that possibility; to the contrary, the AAP recognizes a per-
son's right to make her own medical decisions regardless of a
statutory age limit that takes nothing but a patient's birth date into
consideration. 
13
108 Id. at 314 (emphasis omitted).
'0o See id. at 316-17.
11o Id. at 317. See supra note 89.
"'1 Comm. on Bioethics, supra note 98, at 533. The AAP suggests several
avenues for dispute resolution before turning to the court: psychiatrists, family thera-
pists, ethics consultants or an ethics committee, religious advisors, etc. Id. at 534.
112 Comm. on Bioethics, supra note 103, at 317.
113 See Comm. on Bioethics, supra note 1, at 354 (stating that "[t]he informed
decision of an adolescent or young adult patient nearing death to refuse further life-
sustaining medical treatment ought to be respected...").
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C. Scholarship from the Medical Community on a Minor's Ability to
Consent to Life-Sustaining Treatments
Aside from the American Academy of Pediatrics' policy state-
ments, there is much discussion in the medical community about (1)
the role a physician should play in the determining the capacity of a
minor to consent to medical treatments and, after a maturity determi-
nation is made, (2) whose opinion should be the final authority in
guiding medical treatment.
In his proposal, Leikin sets the general tone for determining a
child's decision-making capacity: "The persons who know the juve-
nile best, the parents and the physician, must perform this difficult
evaluation. This great responsibility is even more difficult because
they must, at a tragic time, make an evaluation of the young person
that is free of their own values and interests." ' 14 Leikin says that pe-
diatricians have three roles in dealing with minor patients and life-
threatening diseases. The first is to promote the minor's mental and
emotional development. The second is to evaluate her level of matu-
rity. The third is for the pediatrician to support the independence of
the patient after he has determined her to be capable of consent. 15
Putting all these roles into play, the pediatrician should facilitate the
self-determination of the adolescent patient. In regards to the patient's
right to final say in a medical decision, Leikin proposes the following
policy:
[I]f a minor has experienced an illness for some time, under-
stands it and the benefits and burdens of its treatment, has the
ability to reason about it, has previously been involved in de-
cision making about it, and has a comprehension of death that
recognizes its personal significance and finality, then that per-
son, irrespective of age, is competent to consent to forgoing
life-sustaining treatment."16
He clarifies that he does not want to give the impression that a
minor deemed mature should be left with no input from her parents or
others who care about her." t7 The article does not explicitly say that
114 Leikin, supra note 5, at 21.
115 Id. at 18.
116 Id. at 21.
117 Id.
Like an adult in a similar situation, the very ill minor needs the caring sup-
port and counseling of family members, physicians, and other health care
professionals. These relationships contribute greatly to reducing the pa-
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physicians should be the primary party to decide if a minor is mature.
Leikin opens with the statement that the physician and parents must
attempt to be unemotional and ignore their personal interests in de-
termining the maturity of the minor.'18 But the author only goes into
the role of the physician in the determination of maturity. This could
be indirect support by Leikin to the fact that the physician is the most
capable of detaching himself emotionally from the patient in order to
determine her maturity.
In their article, Caring for Gravely Ill Children,1 1 9 a group of
twelve medical professionals (primarily physicians) create their own
policy concerning treatment decisions for children with life-
threatening illnesses. The group recognizes how a treatment policy
might be viewed differently in application to ill adolescents. In an
ideal world, the decision making would involve mutual opinion input,
evaluation, and agreement between the patient, physician, and par-
ents. l12 In recognition that collaboration between the parties will
sometimes fail, the article supports physicians following the decisions
of the adolescent after the physician has determined the patient to
cognitively and psychosocially mature.' 2' Morally, physicians cannot
accept a parent's decision over a mature adolescent's decision. 122
tient's anxiety and insecurity, thereby enhancing reasoned decision making
and providing personal meaning to all those involved.
Id.
118 Id.
119 Alan R. Fleischman et al., Caring for Gravely Ill Children, 94 PEDIATRICS
433 (1994).
120 Id. at 437.
121 The authors do not discuss the role of parents in determining a minor's
maturity. Rather, the article is explicit of the role the physician plays in determining
maturity. It appears the authors are arguing that it is the physician (or other health
care providers) alone who have the responsibility of declaring a minor capable or
incapable of making their medical decisions. "When the adolescent patient is deemed
cognitively and psychosocially mature by the physician... ? The health care profes-
sional, after careful assessment of the young person's capacity and mental health,
should respect the adolescent's position while working with the family to develop a
reasonable plan of management." Id. at 437.
122 "[W]e believe the physician should respect the adolescent's decision,
informing the parent that the health care team cannot morally accept surrogate
decision-making for a patient who is functionally autonomous." Id. at 437.
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In 1995, the Midwest Bioethics Center123 published guidelines
concerning health care treatment decision making for minors. 24 The
guidelines were written in response to the Patient Self-Determination
Act 2 5 because the Act does not extend to minors. 26 The guidelines
are based on three proposals. First, the task force proposes that health
care providers are ethically obligated to obtain the assent of minor
patients "who are capable of participating in treatment decision
making but have not yet fully developed decisional capacity."' 127 Sec-
ond, the task force proposes the form of "informed parental/guardian
permission" to replace parental consent.128 Informed parental/guardian
permission requires the parent of a minor patient to receive all the
information concerning the illness and treatments from the health care
provider, as if the parent was the patient.' 29 The parent then provides
"informed permission" to the medical care givers; if the child has a
developing capacity for decision making, informed permission should
be coupled with the assent of the child.' 30 This proposal demonstrates
123 In May 2004, the Midwest Bioethics Center changed its name to the Cen-
ter for Practical Bioethics. See Midwest Bioethics Center Changes Name, KAN. CITY
Bus. J., May 24, 2004, available at http://www.bizjoumals.com/kansascity/stories/
2004/05/24/dailyl2.html. Established in 1984, the Center is a non-profit institution
that raises and responds to ethical issues in health care. See Center for Practical Bio-
ethics, About Us, http://www.practicalbioethics.org/cpb.aspx?pgID=866 (last visited
Oct. 31, 2006).
124 Midwest Bioethics Center Task Force on Health Care Rights for Minors,
Health Care Treatment Decision-Making Guidelines for Minors, 11 BIOETHICS
FORUM A/I (1995). The guidelines were drafted by a task force of pediatric health
care providers over a three year period. Id. at A/2. Note that the guidelines were pub-
lished in the same time frame (1994-95) the American Academy of Pediatrics pub-
lished its guidelines on minor's decision-making capacity in health care treatments.
See discussion supra pp. 197-200 and accompanying notes.
125 See supra note 7.
126 Midwest Bioethics Task Force, supra note 124, at A/I.
127 Id. The guidelines define an individual with decisional capacity who "has
the ability to make a specific decision, i.e., the ability to understand relevant informa-
tion, to reflect upon it and to communicate the decision (verbally or non-verbally) to
providers. The term decisional capacity can also be understood as the ability to par-
ticipate in an informed consent process." Id. at A/3.
128 Id. at A/I (emphasis omitted).
129 Id. at A/3.
ISo Id. at A/4.
Some minors have a developing capacity for rationality, participation in de-
cision making and autonomy (e.g., elementary school aged children). Their
capacity is not so fully developed as that of mature minors. However, since
they are not completely lacking in decision making capacity, respect for
such minors requires explicit acknowledgment of their role in health care
decision making and treatment.
Id. at A/5. In referencing very young children's decisional capacity, the Task Force
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the task force's concern that the concept of parental consent (and pa-
rental right of refusal) is incompatible with the ethical obligations and
responsibilities of health care providers to their minor patients.13 1 The
third proposal states that all persons, including minor children, "with
decisional capacity have the right to make health care treatment deci-
sions . . 1. 2 The drafters qualify this proposal with the following
statement: "[W]e are committed to the pursuit of a shared decision-
making model which respects the important and distinct roles of chil-
dren, parents, and providers in health care decisions."133 As such, the
task force believes it is the shared responsibility of the minor, the par-
ents, and the medical care providers to assess the minor's decisional
capacity. 134 The task force does not provide a preference for the medi-
cal providers' opinion over parental opinion, although, one commen-
tator has noted, "[r]esponsibility for successful implementation of the
Guidelines will fall on those in the health care profession.' ' 135 If there
is a conflict between any of these parties, conflict resolution might be
warranted with legal resolution as a last resort. 36 But the underlying
notion of the third proposal is that if a minor has decision capacity,
she should be independent to make her own medical treatment deci-
sions like an adult.
Although the Midwest Bioethical Center's guidelines have found
general support from the medical community and reflect the enumer-
ated policy of the AAP and other scholars, 137 there are detractors who
writes:
When minors lack capacity to make or communicate treatment decisions
(e.g., infants, pre-schoolers, and same cognitively impaired children), such
decisions are commonly based on what is called a "best interest of the child
standard."..... [P]arents should be allowed to determine which course of
treatment is in the best interests of their child. This presumption is subject
to challenge in cases where the course of action chosen by the parents is
clearly contrary to providers' judgments ....
Id.
131 Midwest Bioethics Task Force, supra note 124, at A/l (noting that the
laws of most jurisdictions recognize the rights of parents to make health care deci-
sions for their minor children).
132 Id. at A/2 (emphasis omitted).
133 id.
114 Id. at A/13. The Task Force gives some broad guidelines in determining
decisional capacity, somewhat similar to the standard outlined in the Cardwell deci-
sion. Id.
135 James M. Caccamo, Children, Society, and Health Care Decision Making,
11 BIOETHIcs FORUM 32, 34 (1995).
136 Midwest Bioethics Task Force, supra note 124, at A/14.
137 See generally William G. Bartholome, Hearing Children's Voices, 11
BIOETHICS FORUM 3 (1995); Carson Strong, Respecting the Health Care Decision-
Making Capacity of Minors, 11 BIOETHICS FORuM 7 (1995). But see generally Joel
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criticize the concept that once a minor is determined to have "deci-
sional capacity" she should be allowed to make any medical decision.
Dr. Lainie Friedman Ross questions the impact such a policy would
have on the intimate relationship of a family.138 She also sees equating
a child's decisional capacity to her right to make a decision as remov-
ing long standing societal protections of children: "[t]o empower chil-
dren with the same rights as adults is to deny them protection they
need. It would mean the dissolution of child labor laws, mandatory
education, statutory rape laws, and child neglect statutes.' 39 Ross
takes great contention with the notion that a "bad" decision by a child
must be respected because the child possesses decisional capacity. 40
James Caccamo writes that successful implementation of the guide-
lines requires extensive education for parents of critically ill chil-
dren. 14  The concepts of minor treatment decisions, from "child
assent" to "informed parental/guardian permission," are difficult for
parents to grasp; 142 if they cannot grasp them, how are they to partici-
pate in decision they technically have a legal right to make?
43
IV. INCLUSION OF MEDICAL POLICIES AND
PROPOSED MEDICAL STANDARDS INTO THE
APPLICATION OF THE MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE
As discussed in Part II, there are different judicial opinions as to
the most useful standard to apply the mature minor. Yet review of
these standards shows that none incorporate any medical concepts on
maturity or show a correlation with medical opinions and policies on
respecting a minor's right to choose their own path of treatment when
ill with a life threatening disease. In order to develop a better judicial
Frader, Minors and Health Care Decisions: Broadening the Scope, 11 BIOETHICS
FORUM 13 (1995) (arguing the Midwest Bioethical Center's guidelines require further
work in certain substantive areas).
138 Lainie Friedman Ross, Arguments Against Health Care Autonomy for
Minors, 11 BIoETHICS FORUM 22, 23 (1995).
19 Id. at 24-25.
140 Id. at 25.
141 Caccamo, supra note 135, at 33 ("This process of [cognitive] development
must be explained to parents so they understand that different levels of decision
making are expected from a pre-school-aged child compared with a fifteen year
old."). See also Davis, supra note 4, at 28 ("As with any program in its infancy, we
must be vigilant in our efforts to ensure that all persons have the knowledge base to
understand the program.").
142 Caccamo, supra note 135, at 33. Hence, why the health care providers will
play such an important role in implementing the Guidelines; they will have to be part
of the education process for parents.
143 Id.
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standard for the mature minor doctrine, the courts should look to the
guidelines and opinions of the medical community in ascertaining a
minor's maturity. Individual health care providers have scientific
knowledge and experience in determining maturity that judges do not
possess. As demonstrated by the discussion in Part III, the medical
community has extensively debated the subject of maturity, re-
searched the issues surrounding a minor's maturity in relation to
making medical treatment decisions, and incorporated ethical consid-
erations. The legal community should reflect on the medical scholar-
ship and recognize that maturity determinations are best left in the
hands of science-oriented disciplines. By allowing the treating physi-
cian to make the determination of maturity of the minor, a court will
be deferring to a well-educated, experienced, and unemotional party.
Hopefully, the repetition of physicians' scientific bases for determina-
tions of maturity will establish a more consistent and defined standard
of application for the mature minor doctrine.
A. Legal Scholars' Proposals
Legal commentators have criticized the common law standards,
or, more appropriately, the lack of standards, for the mature minor
doctrine. The criticism has caused some scholars to weigh in with
their own proposals to change or improve the standards of the mature
minor doctrine. Review of these proposals shows that they are just as
lacking as the current judicial standards. Wallace Mlyniec notes that
in abortion cases, where the court is determining whether a minor is
mature enough to make her own decision on the procedure, trial
judges have revealed little information on how they ascertain the
child's maturity. This is due in part to confidential proceedings and
the fact that few of these cases have reached appellate review. 44 But,
from the cases that have received appellate review, it appears that trial
judges determine maturity based on their perceptions of a child's de-
meanor during testimony.145 Mlyniec concludes:
It seems clear that, despite a legal recognition of the impor-
tance and relevance of social maturity and cognitive capacity
in many different kinds of cases involving children, trial
judges gain very little information about those concepts dur-
ing a hearing, and spend very little time considering them.
Further, when judges determine that a child is mature or intel-
lectually capable of making decisions, the factors considered
144 Mlyniec, supra note 20, at 1889.
145 Id.
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in reaching those decisions frequently do not reflect the ac-
cumulated research about child development.
46
He blames the courts' ignorance of cognitive development and
their lack of analysis into the minor's cognitive abilities on the speed
with which cases move through the courts, resulting in this type of
scientific evidence not being admitted into the trial record.' 47 Mlyniec
properly points out that judges must take into consideration the scien-
tific data on maturity and the obtrusive nature of a judge ordering an
unwanted medical procedure upon a child. It is a step in the right di-
rection for Mlyniec to argue for judges to include cognitive develop-
ment theories into their decisional process. But Mlyniec's general
conclusion does not pinpoint a solution to any of the legal situations
in which a determination of a child's maturity plays an integral role.'
48
His conclusion is simply too broad to define any particular standard
for a minor in a life-threatening medical situation.
In Asking Adolescents: Does a Mature Minor Have a Right to
Participate in Health Care Decisions?, Cara Watts analyzes courts'
approaches in determining if a minor has the right to make a medical
decision without parental consent.1 49 She develops a three-part stan-
dard for determining whether a minor should have autonomy to make
a medical decision: if there is (1) no reason to deny an adult the right
to make her own decision in the situation, (2) no reason to treat a mi-
nor differently than an adult in the situation, and (3) no state interest
in protecting the minor, then the minor should have the same deci-
sional rights as an adult in the situation.1 50 To determine if a minor
should be treated differently than an adult in the same medical situa-
tion, a court would consider a treatment's effectiveness, a minor's
chance of survival with or without the treatment, and the emotional
and physical effects of the treatment on the minor.15 1 Watts evaluates
her standard to be "fair, systematic, accurate and critical."'
' 52
146 Id. at 1903-04.
147 Id. at 1891.
148 Mlyniec discusses determinations of maturity in custody, adoption, abor-
tion, medical, and criminal cases. See generally id.
149 Cara D. Watts, Note, Asking Adolescents: Does a Mature Minor Have a
Right to Participate in Health Care Decisions?, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 221,
222-23 (2005).
150 Id. at 240-41. The author clarifies that the courts should only raise the
issue of a minor's decisional right in health care issues when "there is a conflict of
interest in the triangle between parents, the child and the state that involves intensive
medical care to treat an extreme health situation." Id. at 241.
151 Id. at 243.
152 Id.
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Watts develops a defined standard, but she surreptitiously adds
"an additional competency element" at the end of her standard and
fails to elaborate on it.153 The additional competency element appears
to be another way of saying that the court must take the maturity of
the minor into consideration. Without the competency element,
Watts's approach would fail because the standard could be used to
argue that any child, regardless of age, should be allowed to make her
own medical decisions. The addition of the competency element rids
the standard of that possibility, but it also swallows the remaining
three-part test. If she includes no guidelines for determining compe-
tency, we are left at the starting point: the judge must determine "ma-
turity" with his own resources. Further, the three parts of the standard
fail to establish a unique mature minor standard when tested. There is
a general common law right for an adult to make her own medical
decisions; an adult would have to be declared incompetent by a court
to lose that right. Part one would then allow a child to make her own
medical decisions unless a court declared her incompetent, but that is
circular reasoning because children are, by law, considered incompe-
tent. Part two states there must be a reason to treat a minor differently
than an adult. The clearest reason to treat a minor differently than an
adult would be based on maturity level. Part three allows for a state
interest to trump a minor's decisional right. This prong is moot be-
cause a state interest, or an accepted public policy argument, can
trump any person's rights, minor or adult. In the end, the "additional
competency element" makes Watts's standard a restatement of any
standard calling upon a court to evaluate a minor's maturity.'
54
Along with commentators' individually created standards, there
are calls to institute a bright-line rule as a standard for the mature mi-
nor doctrine. 155 The most obvious bright-line rule would be to allow
minors to make their own medical decisions starting at a certain age,
such as sixteen. A rule like this would not require a health care pro-
vider, or the legal system, to become involved in the decisions of mi-
nors who are near the age of majority, the age range of most patients
in mature minor cases. 156 One proponent of the age sixteen bright-line
rule notes that there is nothing "sacred" about age eighteen in our so-
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 See Laurie Badzek & Sherry Kanosky, Mature Minors and End-of-Life
Decision Making: A New Development in Their Legal Right to Participation, 8 J.
NURSING L. 23, 23 (2002); Newman, supra note 12; but see Oberman, supra note 10,
at 133.
156 Oberman, supra note 10, at 133.
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ciety, 157 and, since no scientific evidence shows that sixteen-year-olds
have less judgment than eighteen-year-olds, the bright-line rule should
triumph.158 The problem with a bright-line rule is that it will disregard
questions of maturity completely, and, although maturity-based stan-
dards with their many factors are not ideal, neither is a standard that
ignores the individual facts of a case.
Although the above recommendations of standards for the mature
minor doctrine contribute positively to the debate, they still demon-
strate the lack of consensus in the legal community on a uniform stan-
dard. They also show the difficulty in articulating a standard that has
definite guidelines but also allows a judge some discretion to consider
the particular facts of the case.
B. Deferring to the Medical Community to Create an Improved
Standard for Application of the Mature Minor Doctrine
A legal standard to determine a "mature minor" has had obvious
difficulty in being defined. The difficulty is demonstrated by the
courts in such decisions as Cardwell, In re E.G., and Long Island, as
well as by legal scholars who have attempted to craft their own stan-
dards. The failure of the legal discipline in defining a standard for
maturity is a result that should not be surprising; a determination of
maturity is a scientific one, something that takes into consideration
biological and social factors and can only be made by a person who
has a frame of reference on the variety of capabilities of children at
different ages. 59 Health care providers, or, more appropriately, pedia-
tricians, have a better ability to evaluate these factors because of their
medical education, training, and experience.
The medical community has researched and debated the issue of
maturity, which provides physicians with all the necessary tools to
determine the maturity of a minor. First, there is the Piaget Cognitive
Development Theory and supporting empirical research that guides
medical professionals as to at what age a person should have certain
cognitive functions.' 60 Second, the AAP has promulgated several pol-
icy statements, taking into consideration experiences with parents,
minor patients, medical knowledge, and the bioethical responsibilities
157 Newman, supra note 12, at 529 ("[Sixteen] is the usual age for employ-
ment, for marriage, and eligibility for the death penalty, and the age to drive a car is
often younger." (footnote omitted)). Also, the legal age to purchase and drink alcohol
is twenty-one.
151 Id. at 531.
159 See Leikin, supra note 5, at 18-21.
160 See discussion supra pp. 194-97.
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of physicians, that support the notion a doctor is the best suited to
make determinations of maturity.' 61 Lastly, physicians themselves
have studied their role in maturity determinations and recognize the
important role they can, and should, play in determining the maturity
of a minor.162 Would a judge have access to all the same information
on maturity as a physician? The simple answer is no. Society should
not even expect a judge to possess all this knowledge. 163
It may seem worrisome to defer such a determination, which can
become legally binding, to someone outside the judiciary or the
government. There are constraints to a physician's determination of
maturity. For instance, the AAP policies tell physicians to take into
consideration the opinions of the minor and her parents;' 64 and physi-
cians themselves recognize the importance of these opinions. 65 Medi-
cal studies on maturity have all established that a child reaches the
apex of cognitive development between fourteen and fifteen; 166 physi-
cians would have a difficult time ignoring so much medical precedent
in declaring anyone under the age of thirteen or fourteen mature
enough to make her own medical decision. If a physician were to
make a clearly erroneous judgment, she would be accountable to peers
in her profession. 1
67
This proposal also does not discount the constraint on physicians'
determinations through judicial discretion. Judges (or juries) will still
have the ultimate determination if a minor patient should be granted
an exception to make her own medical decisions. Just because a health
care worker testifies in court that, in her professional opinion, the mi-
nor is mature, the judge still can take the other circumstances of the
case into consideration before making a final ruling. If a health care
worker determines a minor to be mature, and a judge rules not to ex-
tend the mature minor exception, the judge should be able to demon-
strate, within the individual facts of the case, why he is ruling against
161 See discussion supra pp. 197-200.
162 See discussion supra pp. 201-05.
163 "To determine decision-making capacity, a judge must have some sense of
the general cognitive functioning of children of the same developmental stage as the
petitioner, and more importantly, a good sense of the cognitive functioning of the
petitioner herself." Mlyniec, supra note 20, at 1891.
164 See generally Comm. on Bioethics, supra note 103, at 314; Comm. on
Bioethics, supra note 8.
165 See Fleischman et al., supra note 119, at 434, 436-37.
166 See Leikin, supra note 5, at 20; Mlyniec, supra note 20, at 1879; Weithorn
& Campbell, supra note 89, at 1589.167 Commentary on current health care issues is one of the main missions of
such organizations as the Center for Practical Bioethics. See generally Center for
Practical Bioethics, supra note 123.
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the medically-determined mature minor. This proposal respects judi-
cial discretion while allowing the judiciary to respect a field of
knowledge and expertise it lacks. By recognizing that the judge still
has final determination of outcomes, some of the concerns around
allowing a minor to make her own medical decision could be
avoided.
168
The proposal to defer maturity determinations to health care
workers is not completely novel. The West Virginia Health Care De-
cisions Act of 2000 statutorily defines a "'mature minor' [as] a person
less than eighteen years of age who has been determined by a
qualified physician, a qualified psychologist or an advanced nurse
practitioner to have the capacity to make health care decisions."
169
The statute was the result of Belcher v. Charleston Area Medical Cen-
ter,170 a case in which the parents and doctor disagreed as to the ma-
turity level of a minor patient (with muscular dystrophy). 171 The
parents signed a Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) order but instructed the
doctor to resuscitate their son if he requested it. 172 The doctor never
consulted the patient as to his wishes concerning the DNR order be-
cause, in the doctor's opinion, the minor was not mature enough to
participate in the decision. 73 When the patient went into respiratory
failure, the doctor followed the DNR order and the patient died. 7 4 The
parents sued for wrongful death, and a jury found for the treating hos-
pital and doctor. 175 The appellate court reversed and remanded the
verdict because the jury had not been instructed to consider the mature
minor exception in its deliberations. 76 In its opinion, the appellate
court noted the importance of the doctor's determination of maturity
and how that determination will often be second-guessed. 177 The court
168 Judicial discretion would stop a minor from making a "bad" decision, a
concern of Ross' in allowing a minor to make her own medical decision. Ross, supra
note 138, at 25.
169 W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3(o) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (emphasis added).
170 422 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1992).
171 Id. at 829-31. The minor patient was seventeen and eight months old.
172 Id. at 830.
173 The doctor contended that he did not involve the patient in the decisions
because: "(1) [the patient] was emotionally immature due to his disease; (2) he was on
medication which diminished his capacity; (3) involving him in the decision would
have increased his anxiety, thus reducing his chances of survival; and (4) [the] parents
told [the doctor] that they did not want [the patient] involved." Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 838 (W. Va. 1992).
177 Id. at 837. The court went further to ensure that the doctor's determination
of maturity was recorded: "[O]nce the doctor has determined that the minor is mature,
this determination should be duly noted as part of the patient's records." Id. at 837
2007]
HEALTH MATRIX
concluded its analysis of the doctrine with the following: "[W]e agree
with the observation that 'the answer will be found in statutory laws
of consent that incorporate an element of the mature minor rule."'
178
The West Virginia legislature followed the opinion of the appel-
late court. 17 9 From this medical malpractice case, the legislature
crafted the above statutory definition of a mature minor to give power
to the medical professionals in deciding if a minor was mature enough
to make health care decisions. This is the only state statute that gives
explicit control to the medical community in determining a mature
minor.180 West Virginia has taken the proposal of this Note a step fur-
ther, from encouraging the judiciary to defer to physicians' maturity
determinations, a rule that could exist in the common law, to codify-
ing it in statutory law. Two commentators have predicted the positive
effects of the West Virginia statute on the mature minor doctrine:
As health care providers in West Virginia follow the man-
dates of their new statute[,] they have a unique opportunity to
develop guidelines and report baseline data relative to practice
patterns, as well as develop standards for determining mature
minor status vis-a-vis advanced care planning. The way in
which these providers determine and document decision-
making capacities of mature minors, and the impact of
autonomous health care decisions concerning advance direc-
tives and end-of-life care, may be the foundation for initiating
new and improved legislation concerning mature minors and
their participation in medical decision making.
i18
n.14.
178 Id. at 837-38 (quoting FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT § 5.2.2
(2d ed. 1990)).
179 The Belcher court was very aware of the bounds of its opinion and actively
avoided legislating from the bench. The court recognized there was a common law
mature minor exception and that the maturity determination was left in the hands of
the fact-finders. See id. The Long Island court was also aware of the necessity of
legislative involvement in the mature minor determinations: "It is recommended that
the legislature or the appellate courts take a hard look at the 'mature minor' doctrine
and make it either statutory or decisional law in New York State." In re Long Island
Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
180 Arkansas has a statute that recognizes the ability of a mature minor to
make a medical treatment decision. "[A mature minor is] [a]ny unemancipated minor
of sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the consequences of the pro-
posed surgical or medical treatment or procedures for himself .... ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-9-602 (1987). The statute does not include who is to determine maturity.
181 Badzek & Kanosky, supra note 155, at 28.
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This quote demonstrates how, for policies like the West Virginia
statute to be most successful and universally implemented, it will be
up to the legislatures to enact mature minor statutes and revise them as
needed.
182
CONCLUSION
Health care professionals need to assert their knowledge and ex-
perience when confronted with a minor who should, or should not, be
allowed to make her own medical treatment decisions. 8 3 The knowl-
edge and experience of health care professionals should not be ig-
nored in making life and death decisions for a minor. By incorporating
judicial deference to a physician's determinations of a child's maturity
in mature minor cases, the common law will start to see the develop-
ment of a defined standard for the mature minor doctrine based on
scientific research and empirical data instead of relying on the stan-
dards of judges, which are usually based on personal experience and
brief impressions of the minor. 1
84
With all the commentary on the mature minor doctrine in relation
to life-threatening situations, why have the courts, or the more aptly
suited legislatures, failed to take significant steps towards defining a
uniform mature minor standard? They are the only institutions that
can settle the debate and implement changes to the mature minor doc-
trine. Has all the medical and legal commentary fallen on deaf ears, or
is the issue too complex? 185 Maybe the legislatures see more pressing
issues in health care. Millions of children have no health insurance
and do not receive adequate health care to begin with.186 Implement-
ing any form of guidelines for the mature minor "may be difficult in a
182 Commentators to the mature minor doctrine have noted that there is not
enough empirical evidence on maturity. See Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 89, at
1590. It seems that this lack of data further supports the contention that physicians
should be empowered to determine maturity in mature minor cases. If physicians are
instilled with this legal capacity, then maybe they will feel a professional need and
responsibility to develop empirical studies to further legitimize the hypothesis that by
fifteen most adolescents are as mature as an eighteen year old.
183 See Fleischman et al., supra note 119, at 438 ("We do not minimize the
importance of the family's role in supporting the adolescent ... but the appropriate
role of the health care professional caring for an adolescent is to respect the patient's
evolving autonomy and foster the young person's role in decision-making.").
8"These [appellate] opinions seldom offer more than generalizations about
a child's legal competency .... [A] judge could obtain little of the information
needed for [a maturity] evaluation in a span of eighteen minutes [of testimony]."
Mlyniec, supra note 20, at 1886-87.
185 See supra note 183.
186 Caccamo, supra note 135, at 32.
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society burdened with family and societal problems."'8 7 Or could it
simply be that mature minor cases arise so infrequently that legisla-
tures have failed to notice the problem, or do they believe that the
courts should simply determine these cases on a case by case basis?
Regardless of these questions and concerns, until there is a gov-
ernmental response, there will be no answers, and the standards of the
mature minor doctrine will be continuously added to and subtracted
from in case law and in the opinions of scholars.
187 Id. at 34.
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